The House of Lords is the world's longest-established and probably best-known second chamber. Wholly unelected, with most members appointed for life, it appears a vestige of the 'elite' form of bicameralism once common throughout Europe. Hence calls for major reform are commonplace. However successful changes have been piecemeal and rare. Meanwhile the UK is not federal, but is nonetheless a 'union state', comprising the territories of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, each with its own distinct governing arrangements. These were most recently boosted by the 1997 Labour government's devolution programme. Hence for decades, and particularly the last 20 years, devolution and Lords reform have both been on the UK's political agenda. Throughout this time attempts to create a 'second chamber of the nations and regions' have repeatedly failed. This paper reviews the proposals made, and the obstacles they faced -drawing lessons for Britain, and territorial bicameralism more widely.
Introduction
The UK might at first glance appear an unlikely candidate for inclusion in a discussion on federalism and bicameralism, having never been a federal state. Its second chamber, the House of Lords, is one of the best-known in the world, but as an unelected body incorporates no form of territorial representation. This paper reviews proposals for a UK territorial second chamber in context, asking why calls to adopt such a model have been so unsuccessful. It begins by briefly reviewing the territorial history of the UK, and the history of debates on Lords reform. It then turns to the various proposals that have been made for forms of territorial representation in the UK second chamber, particularly since the 1990s. In doing so it recognises that territorial representation may potentially be reflected in both the composition and the functions of a second chamber (Russell 2001) . While UK debates have given some limited attention to the former, they have barely touched upon the latter. The paper ends with a summary of the obstacles to creating a UK territorial second chamber. Some of these are relatively unique to the UK case, but others are familiar from other countries' long-running debates on territorial politics and second chamber reform. removed the House of Lords' absolute veto over legislation, reducing this to a power of delay in most cases. II The same Act also defined a category of 'money bills' over which the chamber's power was even more constrained. The 1949 Parliament Act reduced the power of delay broadly from two years to one, which is where it remains. Hence the House of Commons can in theory pass a bill without the Lords' consent; but in practice this has occurred only very rarely, and the two chambers tend instead to reach agreement through negotiation.
Changes to the composition of the House of Lords have occurred more slowly. Prior to 1958 the chamber comprised largely of hereditary peers (who passed their titles down the -almost invariably male -family line), alongside 26 Church of England bishops. III In 1958 a Conservative government passed the Life Peerages Act, which allowed new members to be created for life, rather than requiring a new hereditary peerage to be bestowed. From this point on, the usual way into the House of Lords was through appointment as a life peer -appointments being made by the monarch, acting on the Prime Minister's advice.
The Life Peerages Act did not remove the existing hereditary peers, and pressures for reform continued. In 1968 Harold Wilson's government introduced a bill for wholesale reform of the Lords, to further reduce its powers and alter its balance of membership.
However this was withdrawn following resistance by the House of Commons.
Subsequently no further government proposals were advanced for three decades.
The 1997 Labour government arrived in office on a manifesto pledge to remove the remaining hereditary peers as 'an initial, self-contained reform', which would be 'the first stage in a process of reform to make the House of Lords more democratic and representative ' (Labour Party 1997) . This 'first stage' was largely achieved through the House of Lords Act 1999, which expelled over 650 such members -roughly halving the size of the chamber. However, following a compromise with the Conservatives, 92
hereditary peers were allowed to remain. Reform nonetheless transformed the membership of the chamber, and particularly its party political balance -since many departing hereditary peers were Conservatives, and very few were Labour. Today the House of Lords includes roughly equal numbers of Conservative and Labour peers, with the balance of power held by the Liberal Democrats and a large group of independent 'Crossbenchers'. 
Options for territorial bicameralism
Given the importance of territorial relations to the UK's constitutional history, it would be natural for a settlement between the nations and regions to have been reflected in reform to the second chamber. Despite also not being strictly federal, such arrangements have for example been captured in 20 th -century reform of bicameralism in Italy (Lodici 1999) and Spain (Juberias 1999).
The modes in which a second chamber can be 'territorial' reflect the broad functions of legislatures: representation, decision-making, linkage and legitimation (Loewenberg 2011 , Russell 2001 . Hence territorial politics may be reflected in either the composition or functions of a second chamber. The extent to which this succeeds in creating a chamber that provides a voice for territorial units, and successfully binds the nation together, depends on certain key features of institutional design.
Compositionally, strongly territorial designs often give territorial units equal representation irrespective of population size (as in the US and Australia, for example), or
give disproportionate weight to smaller units (as in Austria, Switzerland and Germany), short of equality. Strongly territorial designs also often involve representation through 'indirect' election, by members of sub-national legislatures (as in Austria, India and South Africa), or even through appointment by sub-national governments (as in Germany).
Alternatively, territorial representatives may simply be elected by the people directly, using the boundaries of subnational units (as in the US and Australia), or be appointed centrally to represent such units (as in Canada).
In terms of policy-making, some territorial second chambers have enhanced powers over legislation affecting the subnational units (e.g. Germany, South Africa). Potential also exists for such bodies to stage territorially-focused debates, organise territorially-focused committees, or give special consideration to bills proposed by subnational units. Procedural arrangements promoting meaningful territorial representation also include provision for block voting by representatives of such units (again for example Germany, South Africa), and for formal accountability mechanisms back to the assemblies of those areas (Russell 2001) .
The extent to which second chambers actually serve a territorial function may hence depend on their composition, powers and procedures. In many states where the second chamber serves notionally as a territorial forum binding the nation together, such as Australia, Canada and Spain, its ability to do so meaningfully is disputed -with implications for legitimation. In Canada the Senate's reputation as a territorial chamber is damaged by the fact that appointments are made by the federal prime minister with no provincial input. In Australia, critics complain that senators, despite being elected as state representatives, vote rigidly along party lines. However, territorial influence can be subtle:
in the latter case the fact that senators are elected by proportional representation ensures that geographically diverse voices are heard in behind-the-scenes meetings in the party room.
A brief history of territorial proposal for House of Lords reform
The above discussion helps to provide a framework against which to judge past proposals for a UK territorial second chamber. This section analyses such schemes across four time periods: before the Labour government's election in 1997, surrounding the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords 1998 Lords -2001 Lords , during the decade 2002 Lords -2012 , and since. The extent to which these included features associated with strong territorial second chambers is summarised in Table 1 . We see that while there have been numerous proposals in the UK for a reformed second chamber compositionally representing the nations and regions, these have largely been at the weak end of the spectrum. Discussion of territorial powers and functions has meanwhile been extremely underdeveloped. Throughout these debates there has been some limited learning from models in other bicameral states.
Pre-1997 proposals
An exhaustive historical account of proposals for a UK territorial second chamber would be challenging, given the plethora of schemes mooted over centuries for Lords reform. But two particularly high profile packages of proposals are worth mentioning in the pre-1997 period. In retrospect, 45 years on, these remain the most radical territorial proposals yet to have been made by any official body on Lords reform. For critics of the Kilbrandon Commission's work, the majority report demonstrated 'tunnel vision', by 'straining so hard (yet unsuccessfully) to focus on a single devolutionary proposal that they dared not look around to see the constitutional problems they were passing by'; yet in proposing an all-UK arrangement for devolution the authors of the minority report suffered from an 'obsession …with comprehensiveness and uniformity' (Daintith 1974: 555) . Neither set of proposals resulted in immediate change, but it was the majority report that went on to have more lasting impact. 
Proposals 1998-2001: the Royal Commission and immediate responses
The By the time a fully reformed second chamber can be put in place, there will be devolved institutions in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. London will have its directly elected Authority. English regionalism will be increasingly recognised through Regional Development Agencies and regional chambers. Some regions may be working towards regional assemblies of their own. The relationship of the second chamber to those bodies will need to be a significant part of the Royal Commission's deliberations; it could have a marked impact on both the second chamber's functions and how its members are selected.
One option mentioned was that of indirect election by the devolved bodies, where the White Paper simply noted that 'If the Commission were attracted to this basic principle it would no doubt wish to take evidence, including from the devolved institutions themselves, as to how this… might operate' (ibid: 48). The purpose of the paper, however, was primarily to illustrate a wide range of ideas, and pass consideration of them over to the Royal Commission, rather than making specific recommendations.
The This caused the Commission to conclude that, while representatives of the nations and regions were desirable, they should be directly elected by the citizens of those areas.
The Commission noted that representation of subnational units in federal second chambers is organised 'frequently on an equal or at least graduated basis, while the lower chamber is constituted on a population basis', commenting that the UK 'however, is not a federal state' (ibid: 59). It went on to suggest that 'the great disparity between the sizes of the different nations and regions of the United Kingdom means that an equal distribution of seats would be inappropriate' (ibid: 105) -population figures are illustrated from an analysis at the time in Table 2 . A consideration here, though not explicitly stated by the Commission, was almost certainly that Northern Ireland would be greatly 'overrepresented'. This could bring particular problems given that area's distinct politics and political party system. The Commission ultimately proposed that elected members should be distributed between nations and regions proportionately to population, and chosen via a proportional electoral system (on the same boundaries as those used for the election of UK MEPs). But concerns about the impact on the chamber's democratic legitimacy and relationship with the House of Commons led the Commission to propose that these members should comprise only a minority of the chamber (12 -35%). VI Most other second chamber members would continue to be appointed at a UK level, albeit via an updated process. As well as dismissing indirect election, the Commission opposed members of the second chamber holding a 'dual mandate' as members of a devolved legislature.
These decisions on composition already limited the possibilities for territorial functions to be performed by the reformed second chamber. The Commission noted that 'Many respondents to our consultation paper agreed that regional representation as a feature of the reformed second chamber could act as a kind of "constitutional glue"' (Royal In retrospect the Royal Commission's proposals look timid, and could be seen as a missed opportunity to propose a strongly territorial second chamber at a key moment for the newly-devolved UK. But the timing, rather than being propitious, proved disadvantageous. The two processes were developing simultaneously, but independently, and Commissioners were cautious about dictating plans from the centre that might not reach approval in the devolved areas. Meanwhile, they were offered little guidance by representatives of those areas. The Commission invited evidence, and received 1,734 submissions. But none were forthcoming from the new bodies in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales. Some interest was expressed in indirect election by political parties from these areas -the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (1999: 3) suggested that there was a 'Strong case for some members to be indirectly elected by members of the devolved national Assemblies and Parliament and the future bodies for the regions of England', while Plaid Cymru (1999: 2) suggested that choice of elected members 'may be by a mixture of direct and indirect election (by the national and regional Assemblies and Parliaments for example)'. But the SNP preferred abolition of the second chamber, arguing that for it to be 'a forum where regional and national voices may be heard' would be 'far from simple' (Scottish National Party 1999: 6); meanwhile the (nationwide) Liberal Democrats (1999: 28) suggested that it would not be 'appropriate to use an electoral college drawn from the nations and regions' and that 'There is no satisfactory substitute for allowing the people of the United Kingdom to elect directly their representatives'.
VII
Greater interest in territorial options was seen in the submissions by some representatives of English regional forums. Indirect election were suggested by the North West Regional Chambers and the Eastern Region Local Government Conference, while various such groups expressed aspirations that the second chamber would enhance cohesiveness, and act as a space for negotiation between different areas. But these bodies themselves, and their ideas, were both underdeveloped.
Some detailed and thoughtful submissions were received by the Royal Commission from academics. Professor Vernon Bogdanor, author of key texts on devolution (e.g. Bogdanor 1997 , Bogdanor 1999a , noted that some hoped a territorial chamber 'could perhaps play its part in holding the United Kingdom together in the face of the centrifugal pressures threatening to tear it apart' (Bogdanor 1999b: 3). But he suggested that direct election to such a chamber would lead to party dominance, while indirect election would face major practical difficulties given the lack of elected bodies in England.
Bogdanor also pointed out that the nature of the devolution settlement -which gave the new bodies largely separate policy responsibilities to those of UK central governmentmade it inappropriate for their members to have a role in scrutinising UK-level legislation.
Another well-known expert, Professor Iain McLean (1999: 3) , noted that either a directly or indirectly elected model was theoretically possible, but that 'the problem of England haunts both models'. He also reflected on the distribution of seats, noting that 'the principle of territory gives equal votes to each territory regardless of population' (ibid: 4), but equality by nation would be unacceptable to England (which accounts for 85% of population), while equality by region might also provoke controversy.
It is hence understandable that the Royal Commission was cautious. Nonetheless, some specialists expressed disappointment post-publication in the lack of imaginative thinking on territorial options in its report. Russell and Hazell (2000: 7) noted that 'The Commission's proposals in this area mostly relate to the composition of the chamber, Regarding roles, the White Paper baldly stated that 'There is no case for giving specific new functions to the House of Lords' (ibid: 11). There was no discussion of any special weighting for regional seats, and the government simply proposed, as had the Royal Commission, that seats should be allocated proportionately by population. Elections should use regional boundaries and there should be 120 elected members in a chamber of 600 (20%), with the remainder centrally appointed. 
Proposals 2002-2012: the battle over direct election
In the next period proposals for House of Lords reform continued to pay some lip service to questions of territoriality, but were largely focused on resolving the increasingly intractable dispute between those who favoured elected versus appointed members. But the committee commented that 'we need to hear from the devolved institutions that they want to be represented in this way. No evidence has been received from the devolved bodies' (ibid). Like others before it, it concluded that indirect election would be 'difficult to pursue further, because it is not a feasible proposition until there are elected assemblies in England which could form electoral colleges alongside the devolved assemblies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland', but commented that this was 'something to revisit in the future, when the devolution settlement is more complete' (ibid).
The committee gave no attention to territorial functions, being largely preoccupied with the argument over the second chamber's composition, and did not consider any other option beyond population-based distribution of seats. Like the Royal Commission and the government, it proposed that elected members be chosen by proportional representation, using the boundaries of the nations and regions.
Following this committee report, the Leader of the House successfully negotiated establishment of a joint committee of both chambers to consider the issue of Lords reform, and to devise a range of options to be put to both in unwhipped votes. The committee issued a report in which it noted that 'a reformed House should contain an appropriate number of members from all parts of the country', but with reference to indirect election commented that 'it is difficult to see at the moment structures which are parallel to those to be found in fully federal countries like the USA and Germany upon 
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Hence, like previous bodies, it simply suggested direct election using regional boundaries. It gave no consideration to territorial functions, but did note joint evidence received from the Presiding Officers of the Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly and Northern Ireland
Assembly, who were all at that time members of the House of Lords, which suggested that such office holders should in future automatically hold seats on an ex officio basis -to provide at least some link to the devolved bodies. Even this minimal proposal has not been acted upon, and no Scottish or Welsh Presiding Officer has since been appointed to the House of Lords.
IX
The centre of the joint committee's report was a set of options for composition combining appointed and directly elected members, where the elected members might comprise 0%, 20%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 80% or 100%. In the votes that followed, the House This demonstrates how, even among senior political actors interested in principle in creating a territorial second chamber, opportunities to achieve this seemed limited and the primary concern was with increasing the proposed proportion of elected members. This was the argument that dominated public debate, with proponents of a high elected proportion demanding a more electorally legitimate second chamber, and opponents fearing the effects on the chamber's relative power in relation to the House of Commons. Labour lost this election, which resulted in the Conservatives again being the largest party -but short of a House of Commons majority. The Conservatives hence formed a coalition government with the Liberal Democrats. The latter party, as already indicated above, had long sought radical Lords reform. However, its primary interest was in an elected second chamber, rather than one necessarily performing any kind of meaningful territorial role.
The minister responsible for Lords reform was the Liberal Democrat Leader, and Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg. A year after the general election he produced a draft government bill for consultation, alongside a White Paper. This followed very naturally from the recently preceding proposals by, first, supporting a chamber that was 80-100% directly elected using regional boundaries and, second, giving virtually no attention to the functions of the chamber, only to its composition. In terms of functions the paper suggested in summary that 'The reformed House of Lords would have the same functions as the current House' (Cabinet Office 2011: 7). Even the use of regional boundaries was discussed only in the context of the electoral system, and justified by stating that 'The Government considers it practical where possible to start from the basis of existing boundaries in use for elections in the UK' (ibid: 16). Far from any suggestion that there should be non-population weighting, the document included a section entitled 'Equally weighted votes', which emphasised that there must be 'broad equality in the potential weight of a vote across the country' (ibid). This was a sensitive topic, as the Conservatives were keen to legislate to equalise the electorates of House of Commons constituencies, in the belief that the present system favoured Labour. Ultimately, the Conservatives and 
Key obstacles to creating a UK territorial second chamber
The preceding section shows that House of Lords reform has been much discussed in the UK over the last century, and particularly the past 20 years. Both of these aspects cause controversy. Specific obstacles to reform include the various vested interests who may wish to maintain the status quo, conflicts between those who seek to strengthen the second chamber and those who prefer to weaken it, low public salience, plus general constitutional rigidity. Although the UK has an unwritten and famously 'flexible' constitution, others of these factors have contributed to Lords reforms being only occasional and incremental, rather than decisive and large-scale (Ballinger 2012) . A second factor more specific to the UK flows from its constitutional flexibility. Unlike many other states, the UK has never had a constitutional 'moment' -for example after war, dictatorship or revolution -which has forced it to construct a new constitution from scratch. Instead constitutional developments have been piecemeal and ad hoc. 
Conclusions
The British case hence holds some lessons for the design of territorial second chambers in general, but also has its own unique features. The piecemeal nature of devolution in the UK, and in particular the lack of uniform devolved institutions in England, alongside the extensive powers devolved to other areas, have presented real challenges for the design of a meaningful 'second chamber of the nations and regions'. Even those who have seen the merits in principle of such a body have struggled to set out a convincing blueprint.
Some moments in the debate over the last century might in retrospect be seen as missed opportunities. The Bryce report of 100 years ago did not -despite the high resonance of 'home rule' debates at the time -propose any very convincing form of territorial representation, and ultimately anyway failed to result in change. The Kilbrandon Commission of the 1970s took a pragmatic and demand-led approach to devolution, focusing on Scotland and Wales, which ultimately set the path for the uneven devolution of the 1990s. Had its minority report been implemented, an all-round system of devolution might have been cemented through a strongly territorial second chamber. However the approach of the majority report was less idealistic and ambitious, and far more in line with the British way. Another 25 years on, the Royal Commission on the Reform of the House  I would like to thank Aman Bharti for background research assistance in the preparation of this article. I Members of the House of Lords are appointed on a national basis and have no form of 'constituency', although their titles do indicate a notional geographical affiliation (e.g. 'Lord Jones of Birmingham'). The exception in terms of members with any more formal territorial link are the bishops, each of whom represents a diocese. But even they collectively all represent the Church of England as a whole, and indeed see themselves as representing people of faith more generally. II The restrictions on the House of Lords' power over ordinary legislation apply only to bills beginning their passage in the House of Commons. Around one third of bills (usually less controversial measures) begin their passage in the House of Lords, where the veto continues to exist. III There were also a very small number of 'life peers' appointed under the Appellate Jurisdictions Act 1876 for their judicial expertise, in order to contribute to the House of Lords' function as the UK's highest court (which ended in 2005, when a Supreme Court was established). IV For a broader and more general analysis of reform proposals over this period, beyond the territorial aspect, see Russell (2013) . V The Liberal Party was a precursor to the current Liberal Democrats, which in turn resulted from a merger between it and the Social Democratic Party in 1988. Lord Steel is also a former Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament, and appears as a proponent of a territorial second chamber later in the paper. VI The Commission put forward three slightly differing models, each comprising a different proportion of elected members. Its preferred option was for 87 regional members in a chamber of 550 (15.8%). VII The Liberal Democrats, and their predecessor parties, had a long-standing commitment to regional representation in a directly elected second chamber. For example the Liberal Party manifesto of 1979 pledged that 'The House of Lords should be replaced by a new, democratically chosen, second chamber which includes representatives of the nations and regions of the United Kingdom, and UK members of the European Parliament'. The 1987 Liberal-Social Democratic Party Alliance manifesto stated that 'The Alliance will work towards a reform of the second chamber linked with our devolution proposals so that it will include members elected from the nations and regions of Britain and will phase out the right of hereditary peers to vote in the Lords' (quoted in Steel 2013). VIII For more detailed discussion see Russell (2013 
